

PSC 160

Campaigns and Elections: A Global Perspective

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Lecture 10: Voting for Public Services in Poor Democracies
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Class Outline

1. Pork, Patronage and Clientelism
2. In-class reading: Harding
3. Do Voters Vote for Public Services in Poor Democracies?
4. Political Business Cycles in Poor Democracies

Pork, Patronage and Clientelism

What is a Public Good?

	Excludable	Non-excludable
Rivalrous	<p>Private goods food, clothing, cars, parking spaces</p>	<p>Common-pool resources fish stocks, timber, coal</p>
Non-rivalrous	<p>Club goods cinemas, private parks, satellite television</p>	<p>Public goods free-to-air television, air, national defense</p>

Non-excludable: individuals cannot be excluded from use

Non-rivalrous: use by one individual does not reduce availability to others

- ▶ Is education a public good?

Public Service Provision in Poor Democracies

- ▶ Public services voters are concerned with may be excludable *and/or* rivalrous
 - ▶ Roads are non-excludable, may be rivalrous
 - ▶ Schools, healthcare may be excludable *and* rivalrous
- ▶ Many economists (but not all) argue that these services are under-provided or inefficiently provided by the market
- ▶ Therefore, poorer voters value government provision of many of these services

Electoral Strategies I

Politicians can make use of **symbolic appeals** or **material inducements** to mobilize voters

- ▶ Symbolic appeals may emphasize shared religious, regional or ethnic identity, and appeal to voters on expressive grounds
- ▶ Material inducements may be either **programmatic** or **non-programmatic**

Electoral Strategies II

Figure 1: 2014 BJP Campaign




Figure 2: 2007 SVP Campaign



Electoral Strategies III

A material inducement is **programmatic** if:

- ▶ there are publicly announced and codified objectives
- ▶ which guide the distribution of the program or good

Example: targeted benefits like unemployment insurance


By comparison, **non-programmatic** inducements are discretionary

Electoral Strategies IV

Two types of non-programmatic strategies available to politicians

- ▶ Pork: non-contingent provision of public or club goods
- ▶ Clientelism: contingent provision of material benefits
 1. Manipulation of public policies – restricting public service provision to particular constituencies
 2. Vote-buying – exchange of goods for votes before elections
 3. Patronage – exchange of public employment for electoral support

Electoral Strategies V



Source: Stokes (2009)

Do Voters Vote for Public Services in Poor Democracies?

Do Elections Matter for Public Service Provision?

Table 1: Democracy and Spending Policy across Countries

dependent variable:	gov. consumption, 1960-90			education spending, 1981-90		social spending	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	pension (6)	nonpen (7)
democracy index, 1960-90	-1.27 (2.14)	-0.39 (2.08)	1.57 (1.99)	0.46 (0.53)	0.42 (0.52)	-0.08 (0.44)	0.72 (0.63)
communist dummy	-0.87 (1.75)	-0.10 (1.77)	-0.45 (1.66)	1.21 (0.45)	1.09 (0.45)	0.82 (0.40)	1.62 (0.60)
British legal origin	2.80 (1.28)	3.19 (1.25)	2.91 (1.17)	0.52 (0.30)	0.53 (0.31)	-0.35 (0.28)	-0.86 (0.40)
% of population aged 65+, 1960-90	0.01 (0.25)	0.08 (0.25)	0.25 (0.23)	0.04 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.58 (0.05)	0.49 (0.07)
log(population)/10, 1960-90	-9.77 (2.54)	-6.92 (3.59)	-8.16 (3.36)	-2.34 (0.84)	-2.28 (0.86)	-0.24 (0.76)	0.02 (1.08)
real GDP per capita, 1960-89 average, log	-2.96 (0.75)	-3.46 (0.77)	-4.58 (0.76)	0.46 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.29)		
share of value added from agriculture, 1960-90					-3.38 (1.60)	-1.95 (0.93)	-2.01 (1.35)
defense spending, % of GDP			0.60 (0.14)				
adj-R-squared	.27	.28	.38	.24	.25	.78	.65
countries	131	125	125	114	110	110	102

Notes: (a) OLS standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant term (not shown)

Mulligan et al. (2004) find little difference in economic or social policy btw democracies and (non-communist) non-democracies – why might this be the case?

Harding and Stasavage (2014) I

TABLE I Primary School Fee Abolitions in Africa (1990–2007)

Country	Year	Following Election?	New Leader Elected?	Free and Fair?	Victor %	Second %
Malawi	1994	yes	yes	yes	47	34
Ethiopia	1994	no				
Uganda	1997	yes	no	yes	74	24
Lesotho	1999	yes	yes	yes	99	1
Cameroon	2000	no				
Sierra Leone	2001	no				
Tanzania	2001	yes	no	yes	75	17
Zambia	2002	yes	yes	no	28	27
Rwanda	2003	yes	no	no	95	4
Kenya	2003	yes	yes	yes	62	31
Mozambique	2004	yes	yes	yes	64	32
Burundi	2005	yes	yes	yes	54	25
Ghana	2006	no				
Liberia	2006	yes	yes	yes	27	19
Benin	2006	yes	yes	yes	36	24
Congo (Brazza.)	2007	no				

Note: See text and appendix for full description of the data and sources. “Following Election” is coded “yes” if an election occurred in the same year or the year preceding a fee abolition. “Free and fair” is coded yes if an election was judged by international observers to have been free and fair as coded by Lindberg (2006). “Victor %” and “Second %” show the proportion of votes garnered by the winner and runner-up, respectively.

Afr democracies have higher rates of school attendance
 ∴ they are more likely to abolish school fees

Harding and Stasavage (2014) II

TABLE 3 Estimates of Pupil/Teacher Ratios

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Enrolled Pupils			Potential Pupils	
Multiparty democracy	4.40 (2.16)		3.14 (1.96)	0.80 (14.4)		-1.28 (14.5)
School fees in place		-8.14 (2.52)	-7.85 (2.70)		-24.7 (12.4)	-22.7 (12.3)
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R ² (within)	.086	.167	.182	.382	.432	.413
N=	341	364	330	329	351	318

Note: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates with standard errors clustered at the country level.

But, no evidence that Afr democracies provide more teachers relative to potential student popn than non-democracies

Harding and Stasavage (2014) III

Evidence that Kenyan voters do not attribute **responsibility** for education outcomes or school quality to the president

TABLE 5 Probit Estimates of the Probability of Expressing Intention to Vote for President Kibaki

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Respondents prefer free schools	.276 (.112)				.303 (.149)	.300 (.154)	.316 (.152)
Experienced overcrowded classrooms		-.065 (.070)			-.073 (.069)		
Experienced poor classroom facilities			-.089 (.082)			-.075 (.083)	
Experienced problems with textbooks				-.073 (.057)			-.078 (.063)
N=	936	554	549	559	524	520	529

Note: All specifications include district-level fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level.

- ▶ How does this compare to how voters attribute responsibility to politicians in richer democracies?

Dasgupta (2014) I

- ▶ Dasgupta argues voters reward politicians for **enactment** of policies and programs – not their **implementation**
- ▶ Relative to incremental implementation, discrete enactment easier to assign responsibility for and to monitor
 - ▶ Implementation may involve cooperation across multiple tiers of administration
 - ▶ Tiers may be controlled by different parties
 - ▶ Thus, especially salient consideration in federal countries like India, Brazil, Mexico

Dasgupta (2014) II

- ▶ Analyses the introduction of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in India
 - ▶ Guarantees each rural household up to 100 days of employment on local public works project
 - ▶ Nearly 70% of India's 1.2 bn population live in rural areas
- ▶ Enacted by the incumbent United Progressive Alliance in 2005, led by the Congress party
- ▶ One of the Congress party's major campaign promises in 2004
- ▶ Seen as contributing to Congress's landslide victory in 2009 elections

Dasgupta (2014) III

- ▶ NREGA increased Congress party vote share in subsequent elections, on average, by 3.25%
 - ▶ Even in opposition-controlled states, where Congress did not control local administration of program
- ▶ Implementation had little or no effect on state-level incumbent vote share
- ▶ Relative improvements in program performance *do* increase state-level incumbent vote share
 - ▶ However, effect size much smaller than for enactment

Harding: Attribution and Accountability

Harding (2015) I

1. According to Harding, do Ghanaian voters hold governments accountable for local road maintenance?
 - ▶ Which governments?
2. Why might we not expect the same findings with respect to the provision of other public goods in Ghana?

Harding (2015) II

4. What makes attribution of responsibility more difficult in Afr democracies than e.g. the US?
5. Is the maintenance of local roads in Ghana a **clientelistic** exchange? Why or why not?
6. Could it be a form of **pork**?

Political Business Cycles in Poor Democracies

Review

- ▶ What is a political business cycle?
- ▶ When might we be more likely to observe a political business cycle?
- ▶ How prevalent are they in rich democracies?
- ▶ Might they be more or less prevalent in poor democracies?

Shi and Svensson (2006)






Fig. 1. Coefficient estimates on ELE in country-by-country OLS regressions.

- ▶ PBCs are **stronger** in developing countries than developed ones
 - ▶ Govts more likely to run budget deficits before elections
- ▶ Explained by weaker institutional constraints on executives

Golden and Min (2013)



- ▶ More unbilled electricity provided to citizens in election years
- ▶ Could we observe this in a country like the US?

Discussion: Well Done Abba Screening

- ▶ What is the government scheme that Armaan Ali tries to avail himself of in 'Well Done Abba' ?
 - ▶ Do you think the scheme can be considered a form of pork? Clientelism?
- ▶ Why does the irrigation minister eventually intervene?
- ▶ Was Armaan Ali treated unfairly?
- ▶ Do you think the government well scheme was an effective poverty reduction scheme?
- ▶ Does the film suggest a possible explanation for why such schemes may fail in poor democracies?

Is it easier or harder for voters to hold governments accountable in poor democracies?

Next Class: Review Session